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Abstract
We argue that the appraisal of models in social epistemology requires conceiving of
them as argumentative devices, taking into account the argumentative context and
adopting a family-of-models perspective. We draw up such an account and show how
it makes it easier to see the value and limits of the use of models in social epistemology.
To illustrate our points, we document and explicate the argumentative role of epistemic
landscape models in social epistemology and highlight their limitations. We also claim
that our account could be fruitfully used in appraising other models in philosophy and
science.
Keywords Social epistemology · Modelling in philosophy · Epistemic landscape
models · Argument view · Epistemic value
1 Introduction
Philosophers employ a wide variety of argumentative resources to support their claims,
including appeals to intuition, authoritative testimony, common sense, case studies,
formal derivations and even experiments. The usefulness of these resources must be
evaluated with respect to their contribution to the strength of a philosophical argu-
ment. In the present paper we suggest that the same principle applies to the use of
mathematical and computational models in philosophy. We argue that to understand
the value—and limits—of models in social epistemology, one needs to analyse them
in the context of the arguments they are used to support.
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We further argue that models in social epistemology function as argumentative
devices. When philosophers build and use mathematical and computational models,
their conclusions often go beyond what can be supported by the premises of their
model. Models are often used to support a broader philosophical claim, and the model
functions as one of the many premises of the argument. Thus, even if one conceives of
a model as an argument in itself (Beisbart 2012), there may well be a gap between what
it can establish (i.e., the model argument) by itself and what the philosopher wants to
conclude (i.e., the philosophical argument). This gap is filled with argumentative steps,
many of which remain implicit. It is crucial to understand these steps to make sense of
how models are used in philosophical argumentation. Our aim in this paper is to make
sense of the functioning of models in this context. Using epistemic landscape (EL)
models in social epistemology as our example, we illustrate how an EL model operates
in a philosophical argument. As we will show, being explicit about the several steps
involved helps in terms of seeing through the argument and assessing its strengths and
weaknesses.
Second, we describe how changes introduced into an existing model could be under-
stood as argumentative moves. Philosophers who use models present their arguments
in the context of existing arguments, as amendments, criticisms or plausible alterna-
tives. It is necessary to understand this argumentative context to make sense of the
model’s contribution. Taking into account this broader context shows how the success
of a model (or a modelling framework) does not depend solely on its intrinsic proper-
ties. The epistemic contribution of a model typically becomes clear after a collective
process of modifying, reinterpreting and criticising the model and its suggested impli-
cations. For example, as we will show, not only did Weisberg and Muldoon’s (2009)
epistemic landscape model suffer from deficiencies such as a lack of representational
adequacy and derivational robustness,1 it also contained programming errors. Never-
theless, it became one of the most well-known models in social epistemology. If one
ignores the dynamics of the later dispute and collaboration, it is hard to understand
its success. More importantly, taking the broader argumentative context into account
sheds light on how the meaning and value of a model may be established long after
its original publication.
Like many other models in social epistemology (e.g., Kitcher 1990, 1993; Strevens
2003; Hegselman and Krause 2009), EL models are highly idealised and sensitive
(i.e., not robust) to changes in their structural assumptions or parameters. Until now,
most of the discussion on the value of EL models has focused mainly on the model-
target dyad (to use Knuuttila’s term 2009a, b) and robustness. We suggest that such a
perspective does not suffice, and argue that to see the value and limits of EL models
one must take into account the fact that they function as argumentative devices. The
representational adequacy of a model can only be evaluated if one understands the
argumentative goals it is intended to serve, and knowledge of its robustness may well
only emerge over time as others modify the assumptions and the implementation
of the original model. Furthermore, one can assess the credibility of a model without
engaging in a pairwise model-target comparison—which would be very difficult in the
1 In the present paper, we use ‘robustness’ to indicate ‘derivational robustness’, which concerns the sen-
sitivity of a model’s results to the alterations of its assumptions (Woodward 2006). In Sect. 5, we briefly
discuss how derivational robustness analysis relates to a broader notion of robustness.
123
Synthese
case of highly abstract models—by making piecemeal assessments of the plausibility
of individual assumptions relative to the argumentative goals.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we briefly introduce the Weis-
berg–Muldoon model and show that a lack of representational adequacy and robustness
are the two main concerns about the use of abstract models in social epistemology.
These are reasonable concerns. We argue, however, that focusing solely on represen-
tation and robustness is not appropriate because it does not take the argumentative
goals and context into account. We also suggest that consideration of the argumen-
tative context, goals and moves elucidates the intended and actual contribution of a
model. Section 3 outlines our account of models as argumentative devices. We claim
that understanding how a model is used in a philosophical argument requires dis-
entangling several layers of argumentation. By way of illustration, in Sect. 3.1 we
disentangle three such layers–the philosophical argument, the conceptual model and
the computational model—in Weisberg and Muldoon’s (2009) argument and show
how their main conclusions are supported. In Sect. 3.2 we examine their argument
in detail, discuss how the credibility of the model can be assessed, and illustrate the
gaps and problems in their argumentation. We further argue that to grasp the value-
added of an abstract philosophical model, one must question how it supports claims
about difference making. We discuss how difference making can be established and
introduce the idea that epistemic benefits from modelling are commonly realised as a
consequence of several modelling attempts.
With a view to analysing how the process of collective exploration ultimately deter-
mines the value of a model, in Sect. 4 we introduce the notions of argumentative goal
and argumentative move. To illustrate the usefulness of these notions and our approach,
we discuss what we call first- and second-generation EL models. In Sect. 5, we broaden
our view from individual models to model families to show that such a perspective
provides a better understanding of how EL models establish difference makers, and
how the discovery of both robust and non-robust results might serve useful purposes.
We also show how the argumentative force of the Weisberg–Muldoon model gradually
emerges in the collective work of people who refined, criticised and explored the EL
framework. Finally, we argue that analysing a model (e.g., the Weisberg–Muldoon
model) in isolation from the argumentative context and other related models cannot
encapsulate the understanding created by this family of models. The final section of
the paper presents our concluding observations.
2 The research topic as an epistemic landscape
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) developed an agent-based model of a population of
scientists to argue for the epistemic usefulness of cognitive diversity in scientific com-
munities. Adapting a biological modelling paradigm introduced by Wright (1932),
the model portrays scientists as agents foraging on a landscape that stands for a sci-
entific research topic. Each patch on the landscape represents a particular research
approach, and the elevation of the patch corresponds to the epistemic significance of
the approach. The population of agents faces the task of finding approaches of non-
zero epistemic significance. There are three kinds of agents: controls, followers and
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mavericks. Controls do not pay attention to which approaches have been adopted by
others; followers have a conservative research strategy and tend to adopt already tried-
out research approaches; and mavericks prefer to explore new approaches. Having
examined populations of agents consisting of different mixes of the three kinds, Weis-
berg and Muldoon suggest that the existence of mavericks in a population enhances
its capacity for making epistemic progress. They contend that maverick agents act as
pathbreakers who help follower agents to find research approaches of high epistemic
significance. One striking outcome of the model is that best epistemic performance is
achieved by a scientific community consisting solely of maverick agents.
The Weisberg–Muldoon model has been followed by a series of models inspired
by the original (see Reijula and Kuorikoski 2019 for a review). However, further
scrutiny revealed a number of shortcomings in Weisberg and Muldoon’s model that
shed doubt on its epistemic value. For example, Alexander et al. (2015) showed that
Weisberg and Muldoon’s conclusions were undermined by an implementation error.
Correcting this error and adding a slight cost of exploration to the model leads to a
situation in which the best epistemic performance is no longer achieved by a 100%
maverick population, it is achieved by a polymorphic population (Pöyhönen 2017). The
model has also been criticised on various other grounds. Thoma (2015), for example,
showed that alternative search rules that appear to be just as compatible with the
behaviour of real scientists as those suggested by Weisberg and Muldoon lead to clearly
different collective outcomes. Furthermore, the model’s depiction of an epistemic
landscape has been criticised as being too simple to capture actual scientific-research
domains (Alexander et al. 2015; Pöyhönen 2017). Martini and Pinto (2017) question
the epistemic value of models of the social organisation of science, including the
Weisberg–Muldoon model, because their representational adequacy is not empirically
established. Finally, explorations of the model show that its results are not robust
(Thoma 2015; Alexander et al. 2015; Reijula and Kuorikoski 2019; Pöyhönen 2017;
Pinto and Pinto 2018). In sum, the main concerns about the Weisberg–Muldoon model
are the following: conceptual problems and errors, a lack of representational adequacy
and non-robustness.
These concerns reflect more general worries about the use of models in social
epistemology. Bedessem (2019, p. 3) argues that models of the division of cognitive
labour suffer from a “fundamental lack of clarity about the exact object which is
divided”, and an ambiguity about what the division of labour is in reality. He also
questions the representational adequacy of models in social epistemology because they
ignore essential components of scientific practice and progress: in ignoring the fact that
scientific fields are hierarchical and interconnected complexes, such models overlook
the context dependency of epistemic benefits deriving from cognitive diversity and
pluralism. Rosenstock et al. (2017) argue in their analysis of epistemic network models
that because most of them are not representationally adequate, what they reveal about
real epistemic networks is limited:
We do not have a good sense of which real world communities are well repre-
sented by which epistemic network models. This is because these models are
highly simplified. They abstract away from many relevant details of such com-
munities. (Rosenstock et al. 2017, p. 250)
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Thicke (2019) puts representational adequacy at the centre of his analysis of the
epistemic value of formal models of science and expresses his concerns about their
theoretical and predictive value. He argues that “the plausibility established by most
formal models of science is very weak; while there might be some similarities between
the organization of scientific communities and the structure of these models, it is often
a very distant sort of similarity” (Thicke 2019, p. 17). Thicke’s other concern, robust-
ness, is also shared by other authors (e.g., Rosenstock et al. 2017; Frey and Šešelja
2018).
When epistemic network effects are highly robust, it makes sense to take them
more seriously as important findings for real world communities. (Rosenstock
et al. 2017, p. 250)
Philosophers of science tend to use representational adequacy and robustness to
evaluate the epistemic value of a model. The intuitions behind these criteria are straight-
forward. First, although philosophers do not agree on what exactly representational
adequacy is, they do generally agree that to be able to establish a link between the
model and its target, some form of similarity or structural mapping (e.g., isomorphism,
homomorphism) or resemblance between the two is needed. In its most common for-
mulation, the requirement is that an epistemically valuable model must be similar to
its target in relevant respects and to a sufficient degree, given its intended use (Giere
1988, 1999, 2004; Mäki 2010, 2011). Second, the robustness requirement states that if
a model is very sensitive to changes in its seemingly trivial (e.g., tractability) assump-
tions, its results could be artefacts of these assumptions. Consequently, one cannot
confidently carry the lessons learned from a non-robust model to the real world (e.g.,
Weisberg 2006; Kuorikoski et al. 2010).
Such concerns about the use of abstract models in philosophy are reasonable. Never-
theless, judgements concerning representational adequacy and robustness are not easy
to make. First, it is not enough to compare a model with its target to evaluate its rep-
resentational adequacy. Considerations of representational adequacy in the literature
cited above focus on pairwise model-target comparisons and isolate the evaluation of
a model’s epistemic value from its intended uses. However, models are used to serve
a diverse set of modelling goals (see e.g., Pielou 1981; Wimsatt 1987; Odenbaugh
2005), and their representational adequacy can only be judged relative to the intended
use. This point is, we hope, uncontroversial. Representational accounts of models fre-
quently explicitly mention the importance of the modelling goals (e.g., Giere 1988,
1999, 2004; Weisberg 2013); nevertheless, the unit of their analysis remains the rela-
tion between a model and its target, or the model-target dyad (Knuuttila 2009a, b).
That is, representational accounts of models focus on how to provide an account of
representational adequacy based on measures such as similarity and resemblance, but
provide no guidance on how to take the modelling goals into account.
Second, model-target comparisons are far from straightforward in the case of
abstract, theoretically motivated models such as EL models, which depict highly
simplified situations that do not correspond to any empirically observable system.
Furthermore, there is no simple metric for assessing the “realisticness” of a model’s
assumptions. Hence, the evaluation of its plausibility is more complicated than is
usually assumed.
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Third, merely focusing on the similarity between a model and its target also leaves
out the context and the model’s relation to other models. This goes against the usual
scientific practice of considering the added value of a model in the broader context
of other—often competing—models, explanations and theories (Ylikoski and Aydi-
nonat 2014). Robustness considerations provide only a partial solution to the problem:
robustness analysis only requires focusing on a set of closely related models and over-
looks the relevance of the broader range and the context. In sum, merely focusing
on pairwise model-target comparisons and robustness leaves out two crucial elements
that would help to make sense of the value and limits of models: modelling goals and
the context.2
If one is to understand the function, value, and limits of a model, one needs to
evaluate it relative to its purpose. In the case of philosophical models, the typical goal
of the modelling is to support a philosophical argument that is embedded in the con-
text of earlier philosophical arguments and debates.3 Overlooking this goal severely
hinders their proper assessment. Thus, the best way to understand the contribution of
models in social epistemology, and in philosophy more generally, is to begin from
the argumentative goals of the modellers, and to take into account the argumentative
context in their evaluation. From this perspective the model is not, in itself, the argu-
ment, it is merely a part of it. In other words, the philosophical argument makes use of
the model. To understand such use, one has to reconstruct the argumentative context,
which includes not only the intentions and assumptions of the model user, but also the
arguments presented in the existing philosophical debate. The latter could also include
models introduced in earlier phases of the discussion.
Let us consider Weisberg and Muldoon’s model again. They start their paper with
an observation about the role and importance of the division of cognitive labour in
science:
While these facts about the nature of contemporary science are well-known
to philosophers, having been discussed by Kuhn and Lakatos, among others,
surprisingly little has been written about the epistemology of divided cognitive
labor and the strategies scientists do and should use in order to divide their labor
sensibly (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, p. 226)
Here they present the broader context of their argument. They also make it clear
that the more immediate context includes earlier philosophical models introduced by
Kitcher (1990, 1993) and Strevens (2003) as well as the philosophical arguments they
support. While expressing their agreement with the general philosophical conclusions
derived from these models, Weisberg and Muldoon highlight an unexplored aspect
of the division of labour within this context. They develop a model focusing on what
2 We do not claim that all earlier accounts of the use of models in social epistemology ignore modelling
goals. For example, Thicke (2019) and Martini and Pinto (2017) explicitly discuss the goals of particular
models. However, we introduce a broader conception of the goals and context of modelling and provide an
account and a detailed analysis of why and how argumentative goals and context matters.
3 Here we understand the notion of argument broadly. An argument “is a sequence of statements where
all but one of the statements (the premises) are intended to provide evidence, or support, for the remaining
statement (the conclusion)" (Cook 2009, p. 15). Philosophical arguments are thus arguments that present
conclusions concerning a philosophical topic. Note that this definition allows for both deductive and non-
deductive arguments.
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happens when scientists in a population adopt different research strategies. Although
they acknowledge the highly idealised nature of their model and the lack of robustness
checks (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, p. 250), they nevertheless argue that it is possible
to “draw some tentative conclusions about division of cognitive labor” (Weisberg and
Muldoon 2009, p. 250). They also claim, on the basis of some additional assumptions
as we will show:
A polymorphic population of research strategies thus seems to be the optimal
way to divide cognitive labor (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, p. 251)
This is the conclusion of their model-based philosophical argument, albeit a tentative
one. In sum, Weisberg and Muldoon use their model to contribute to a debate con-
cerning the division of cognitive labour (the argumentative context). Understanding
how the model functions as part of their philosophical argument is the key to under-
standing its value and limits. A model may have various roles in an argument. Among
other things, models serve as representations of empirical targets, proof of conceptual
possibility, formalised thought experiments and mere illustrations. Thus, the represen-
tational adequacy or robustness of a model cannot be assessed independently of the
role it is supposed to play in an argument. For example, if the purpose is to support
a claim about a conceptual possibility or to explore possibilities, a highly idealized
model might suffice. If the purpose is to illustrate the sensitivity of a certain result
to certain assumptions, a more complex, non-robust model could do the job.4 Seeing
models as argumentative devices helps in putting their functions into context. What a
model does is not its intrinsic feature: it depends on how it is used and what it is used
for. Is it used to establish some new claim in the debate, or is the purpose to strengthen
or weaken an existing claim? Is it used to examine the generality of a claim, or to
demonstrate the irrelevance of certain considerations for the claim? Identifying the
argumentative goal and the argumentative modelling moves (see Sect. 4) that support
it helps the reader to determine the intended contribution of a model.
The argumentative context is also relevant in establishing the model’s actual contri-
bution, which might turn out to be different from what was intended. The identification
of the original intentions of the modeller is of course valuable in assessing whether
the model succeeds in satisfying the modeller’s goals. However, it is rarely sufficient
in understanding the value of a model. An understanding of what the model is good
for tends to emerge over time, after careful consideration by other participants in the
debate. Thus, the original model, or its presentation alone, could be misleading as
a source for estimating its ultimate value (or lack of it). A mere focus on the mod-
eller’s intentions overlooks how the model is used in argumentation, which is critical
to seeing the flaws in model-based arguments. The argumentative context is decisive,
because it helps to shed light not only on what a philosopher wants to do with a model,
4 As an example of highly idealized modelling in social epistemology, consider the opinion-dynamics
model by Hegselman and Krause (2009). In order to focus on general features of truth seeking and opin-
ion aggregation—not on any particular target system—the authors adopt what they call a low-resolution
modelling approach that abstracts away from detail, and only retains a few key properties of judgment
formation and deliberative social exchange. As an example of how the use of a more complex model could
help philosophers make their point see Frey and Šešelja (2019), who use their model to argue that simplicity
of agent-based models may have a price.
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but also on what the model actually contributes to the debate. This is one reason why
philosophers who have expressed their concerns about the Weisberg–Muldoon model
and the use of models in social epistemology in general have sometimes missed the
point: they have merely focused on the properties of a given model instead of con-
sidering more carefully how a family of related models could contribute to a broader
inquiry.
3 ELmodels in the service of social epistemology
The success of a philosophical argument depends on the strength of the link between
the premises and the conclusion. As we stated above, in a model-based argument the
premises will cite at least one model. We do not specify how the model is used to
support an argument, or how it is used to formulate the premises, because this depends
on how the philosopher chooses to use it. In the case of EL models, the model used is a
computational one: a computer program that implements a conceptual model, which,
in turn, is used to support an argument. To understand how EL models function as
argumentative devices it is useful to clearly disentangle between these three different
layers of the process. As we will show, both modelling layers introduce potential “soft
spots” in the argumentation that might be difficult to identify. We will also show where
such soft spots reside in EL models, and how they should be taken into account when
the strength of the overall argument is assessed.
In this section we first introduce the different layers of argumentation, then we show
how they can be used in appraisals of the argument, and in conclusion we discuss an
important function of models in philosophical argumentation: establishing difference
makers.
3.1 The structure ofWeisberg andMuldoon’s argument
Philosophers employ several kinds of devices in support of their arguments, such as for-
mal derivations, thought experiments, case studies and even common-sense reflection.
Models could be considered one of the elements in their toolbox. Both mathemati-
cal models (e.g., Kitcher 1990, 1993; Strevens 2003) and computer simulations (e.g.,
Weisberg and Muldoon 2009; Pöyhönen 2017; Zollman 2007) have been used as such
argumentative devices.
As we noted above, in the case of computer simulations, two distinct layers of mod-
elling should be distinguished: the conceptual model and the computational model. A
conceptual model is typically presented in a research paper, although some of its details
might remain implicit. Weisberg and Muldoon’s EL model suggests how the central
notions in a general argument, such as cognitive diversity and the division of labour,
can be made precise. The constructs of the research approach and the different learn-
ing strategies of agents, as well as the measures of collective epistemic performance
(e.g., epistemic progress) are examples of conceptual-model operationalizations of the
general notions of interest.
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Fig. 1 Argument and the layers of modelling
In addition, the conceptual model serves as a blueprint for the computational model,
meaning the implementation of the model in a computer program. In principle, the
computational model could be considered a deductive device that takes the modelling
assumptions as input and produces the modelling results as output (Beisbart 2012). It
should be borne in mind, however, that even if the computational model is conceived
of or reconstructed as a deductively valid argument, this does not imply that the
philosophical argument in question is also deductively valid. The model typically
supports only part of the reasoning involved in the philosophical argument.
Now let us consider Weisberg and Muldoon’s philosophical argument for the fol-
lowing tentative conclusion: the optimal division of labour could be achieved with a
polymorphic population of research strategies. How do they support this conclusion?
They do so by means of results obtained from the computational implementation
of a conceptual model, and two informal assumptions (i.e., assumptions that were
not explicitly modelled). Let us now trace how Weisberg and Muldoon arrive at this
conclusion. In order to simplify the picture, we omit many details in our skeletal
representation of their argument.
In setting up their conceptual model (arrow A in Fig. 1), Weisberg and Muldoon
appear to make the following assumptions, among others.5 For the sake of brevity, we
first present the assumption of the conceptual model and then the computational-model
analogue of it in parenthesis.
P1 A scientific research topic can be represented as a set of research approaches
(the set of patches comprising the landscape)
P2 The epistemic significance of research depends on the research approach adopted
by the scientist (elevation of the patch)
P3 Similar research approaches have comparable epistemic significance (smooth-
ness of the landscape)
5 Weisberg and Muldoon present some of these assumptions as the “conceptual component[s] of epistemic
landscapes” (2009, p. 228, emphasis added).
123
Synthese
P4 Scientists care about epistemic significance, i.e., about the “significance of the
truth that is uncovered by employing a given approach” (p. 229) (Agents try to find
high-elevation patches on the landscape)
P5 Scientists can only gradually change their research approach (Agents cannot
jump over the landscape: they move one patch at a time)
P6 Different strategies for changing one’s research approach constitute a relevant
form of cognitive diversity in a community of scientists (Three types of agents—-
controls, followers and mavericks)
…
There is obviously continuity between the conceptual assumptions and the assumptions
implemented in the computational model. Nevertheless, the differences are signifi-
cant. For example, the assumption that scientists care about epistemic significance
(conceptual model) differs significantly from the assumption that agents try to find
high-elevation patches on a landscape (computational model; see P4, above). Thus,
whether the result of the computational model supports the conclusions at the level
of the conceptual model turns out to be an important question for the appraisal of the
philosophical argument.
Although the assumptions of the conceptual model lay down the basic framework
of the analysis, it is still too vague to derive precise results. The implementation of the
conceptual model in a computer program (arrow B in Fig. 1) makes the derivation pos-
sible, but with a slightly different set of assumptions that are taken to be an appropriate
implementation of those of the conceptual model. Moreover, the conceptual model is
incomplete in several ways, and it must be accompanied by various implementation
assumptions (IA) to make the derivation of quantitative modelling results possible.
The original EL model, includes such assumptions concerning:
IA1 The size of the landscape (101×101 grid)
IA2 Scheduling (do agents move simultaneously or sequentially)
IA3 Time scale, or how long a simulation is allowed to run (max 50,000 cycles)
…
The addition of these implementation assumptions allows the research approaches,
the significance of the research and the behaviour of scientists to be represented in
a particular way in the computational model in comparison to the conceptual model
presented by Weisberg and Muldoon. It is on these premises and assumptions as well
as the corresponding analysis of the computational model that Weisberg and Muldoon
(among others) base the following interim conclusions (IC, arrow C in Fig. 1):
IC1 Maverick agents stimulate the problem-solving ability of followers (mavericks
help followers to hill-climb)
IC2 Adding maverick agents to a population of controls and followers increases the
population’s capacity to make epistemic progress (epistemic progress  df propor-
tion of non-zero patches discovered by the population at a particular time)
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IC3 The increased epistemic efficiency of the mixed population of agents (IC2)
relies on mavericks stimulating the followers to make considerable epistemic and
total progress (IC1)
Note that these interim conclusions still do not imply the tentative conclusion in
Weisberg and Muldoon’s argument (i.e., that an optimal division of labour could be
achieved with a polymorphic population of research strategies). In an attempt to reach
this more general conclusion they make an additional informal assumption (IN1),
which was neither implemented in the computational model nor presented with the
conceptual model.
IN1 Different strategies have differential costs. In particular, it is more costly to be
a maverick than a follower. (p. 250)
On the basis of their interim conclusions and this informal assumption, they conclude
(arrow (d)):
C1 A polymorphic population of research strategies thus seems to be the optimal
way to divide cognitive labor. (p. 251)
Furthermore, although not stated in these precise terms, the interim conclusions are
meant to support the more general philosophical conclusion:
C2 Scientific research requires the beneficial division of cognitive labour, which
can be brought about by means of cognitive diversity
As this schematic representation of the argumentative structure indicates, the deriva-
tion of philosophical conclusions relies on several elements including the specification
of models (arrows A–B in Fig. 1) and interpretations of results (arrows C–D in Fig. 1).
Each step typically introduces new assumptions into the process. Hence, the strength
of the philosophical argument, as well as the truth and relevance of its conclusions,
could be contested by challenging the assumptions and the argumentative links, as
depicted in our schematic presentation.
3.2 Reappraisal of the argument
To see if the string of argumentation works, one could start by asking whether the
models are valid in the sense that their results follow from their assumptions. A minimal
validity condition for a computational model is that it must be free from programming
and implementation errors. The process of ascertaining this is referred to as verification
in the literature on simulation (see Gräbner 2018 and the citations therein).
It is also worth pointing out that in the case of EL models, what are typically called
modelling results are not the same as output data: they are rather summaries of some
distribution in the output dataset produced by numerous runs of the simulation model.
Each single run of a computational model is an algorithmic process, the outputs of
which could be considered deductive consequences of its inputs. However, because
the modelling results tend to be based on a statistical analysis of numerous runs, they
are not simply logical consequences of the modelling assumptions alone. In other
words, the appropriate analysis of the output data, the statistical assumptions and
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the model used become an important part of the argument. Needless to say, if the
statistical modelling of the output dataset is done incorrectly, what are reported as
modelling results might not follow from the model’s assumptions. As an example, let
us consider Weisberg and Muldoon’s claim that the epistemic efficiency of the mixed
population of agents in their model is due to mavericks stimulating the followers to
make considerable epistemic and total progress (IC3, above). A careful analysis of the
model (see Alexander et al. 2015, Figure 8) reveals that no such stimulation occurs.
Instead, further progress on the population level is generated solely by mavericks.
The problem is that Weisberg and Muldoon jump to the wrong conclusion due to an
insufficiently detailed analysis of the output data.
Another question concerning the strength of the philosophical argument is whether
the computational model aligns well with the conceptual model (arrows B and C
in Fig. 1). Does the implementation of the simulation line up with the conceptual
model? Are the model results robust to changes in the implementation assumptions,
parameters, software engineering and decisions, for example? In the Weisberg–Mul-
doon case, the computational model plays a key role in establishing the mapping from
the proportion of mavericks to the dynamics of epistemic progress. Computational
implementations of the components of the conceptual model (the different kinds of
agents, landscapes, epistemically significant outcomes and so on) are generated in
the computer program. Next, the computational model is run with a model structure
and parameter values corresponding to different scenarios formulated in terms of the
conceptual model. The values of the outcome variables (e.g., epistemic progress) are
observed across these runs. Conclusions from the modelling stated on the level of the
conceptual model rely on the input–output mapping of the computational model: it is
with the help of a computer program that the modeler establishes which conceptual-
model conclusions follow from which assumptions. Hence, claims concerning the
implications of the conceptual model depend on the computer program and its ability
to serve the inferential role attributed to it. In the case of the Weisberg–Muldoon model
there is, in fact, a discrepancy between the description of the follower rule in the con-
ceptual model and its computational implementation, which compromises conclusions
about the relative epistemic performance of different kinds of agents (Alexander et al.
2015; Pöyhönen 2017). The argument from the premises of the conceptual model to
its conclusions is not valid because a sequence of inferential steps implemented in the
computational model fails.6
Let us now look at the next argumentative step (arrow D in Fig. 1), moving from
the conceptual model to philosophical conclusions of interest. To establish that the
modelling results alone are not sufficient for making the inferential transition, let us
consider, for example, the different conceptual-model constructs used by the authors
to capture the idea of epistemic efficiency: they use three distinct outcome measures
to track the epistemic efficiency of a population of scientists. First, they keep track
of how long it takes the population to find the two peaks of the landscape. Second,
they define a measure they call epistemic progress as the proportion of non-zero
patches visited at a particular time. Finally, they also keep track of the proportion
6 Despite the implementation error, the computational model naturally supports some argumentative tran-
sition, but it is not the one Weisberg and Muldoon report in their paper, i.e., in their conceptual model.
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of all patches visited by some member population, which they label total progress.
By providing counterexamples, Pöyhönen (2017) argues that none of these measures
can function as an appropriate measure of epistemic efficiency, which is the more
general philosophical idea implemented by the three variables. On the one hand,
peaks-reached can be maximised by placing all agents in the peak patches, which
corresponds to extremely poor epistemic coordination. Epistemic progress, on the
other hand, is not sensitive to the elevation of a patch, and hence, especially on rugged
landscapes, may correlate poorly with whether the two hills of epistemic significance
have been discovered by the population. Finally, what Weisberg and Muldoon call
“total progress” appears largely irrelevant to epistemic efficiency because it fails to
distinguish the discovery of significant patches from the examination of zero-value
approaches.
Note how this problem differs from the ones discussed above. It is an issue that
concerns the relationship between the conceptual model and the philosophical argu-
ment (arrows A and D in Fig. 1). Even if the computational implementation of the
constructs (e.g., epistemic progress) is adequate, the constructs themselves cannot
serve the argumentative role assigned to them in the argumentation (i.e., to support
conclusions C1 and C2).
Another factor that could weaken the philosophical argument is the lack of robust-
ness of modelling results. If the simulation is highly sensitive to changes in a parameter
value or to seemingly insignificant choices in the computational implementation, this
challenges the reliability of the general conclusions that could be drawn from it. In this
sense concerns about the robustness of philosophical models (see Sect. 2) are justi-
fied. However, it should also be recognised that various aspects of a model’s robustness
emerge over time as other philosopher modellers take on the task of analysing and
using the original model. Moreover, the discovery of non-robust results might indicate
the conditions under which a philosophical argument is tenable and help in discover-
ing critical assumptions as well as difference makers. Thus, non-robust results could
be informative in showing the range of conclusions that could be supported by the
computational and conceptual model. As we argue later on (Sects. 3.2 and 5), making
sense of the positive and negative implications of non-robustness requires taking the
broader argumentative context into account.
Finally, the applicability of the epistemic-landscape conceptual model could also
be challenged more generally. The extent to which the philosophical argument is con-
vincing depends on the credibility of the models involved. Appraisal of the credibility
of a model requires more than a comparison of the model with its intended target. For
example, Sugden (2000) suggests that credibility depends on the logical coherence
(i.e., validity) of the model as well on how well the model fits into our general under-
standing of the causal structure of the world. Credible models, according to Sugden,
describe “how the world could be” rather than being accurate descriptions of particular
or generalized real-world target systems.7 Concerning credibility, one could ask the
following questions. Are the assumptions of the model plausible given the modelling
goals and the argument of which it is a part? Are the construct (model world) and its
7 On the credibility of models also see Cartwright (2009), de Donato Rodríguez and Zamora Bonilla (2009),
Grüne-Yanoff (2009), Kuorikoski and Lehtinen (2009), Mäki (2009) and Sugden (2009).
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dynamics (what happens in the model world), as well as the model results (findings),
broadly consistent with our general knowledge of the world? Obviously, these ques-
tions are similar to those concerning representational adequacy discussed above. We
are not suggesting that representational adequacy has no role to play in assessments
concerning the use of models in philosophy. As should be obvious by now, we are
arguing that representational adequacy must be evaluated in light of the argumentative
goals and the broader argumentative context. Moreover, one can establish or question
the credibility of a model without engaging in pairwise model-target comparisons, by
way of making piecemeal assessments of the plausibility of individual assumptions
relative to the argumentative goals, and considering how the model and the suggested
conclusions fit what we already know about the world. As we will show, in the case of
EL models, attempts to improve plausibility and credibility turn out to be another way
of exploring what could be called the argumentative landscape relevant to the philo-
sophical topic in question, i.e. the constellation of possible premises, conclusions and
paths of reasoning connecting them. Such exploration results in a better understanding
of the dependency between proposed variables, and of the conclusions that a given set
of premises can support. However, to show this we should first discuss an important
function of modelling: establishing difference makers.
3.3 Differencemaking and robustness
We suggested above that understanding how models function as argumentative devices
requires making explicit the assumptions that contribute to model-supported argu-
ments and keeping score of how strongly they support the conclusion of interest.
Grasping the different steps of the argumentation and the credibility of the models
is only part of the story, however. Bringing the value-added of simulation mod-
els into focus requires closer attention to the kind of conclusion being argued for.
Simulation-based philosophical arguments typically use models to support claims
about difference-making. For example, Weisberg and Muldoon aimed to show in their
modelling efforts that changing the proportion of mavericks in the population of scien-
tists makes a difference to its epistemic performance. Later models in the EL tradition
qualified this difference-making result in various ways. Thoma (2015), for example,
shows that such dependency holds only when scientists are not too inflexible in their
choice of a new research topic and not too ignorant of others’ work. Pöyhönen (2017)
suggests that the original difference-making relation between cognitive diversity and
epistemic performance does not hold on the kind of smooth landscapes studied by
Weisberg and Muldoon; it is only on rugged landscapes that a heterogenous popula-
tion of agents outperforms a homogenous population. Although pointing in somewhat
different directions, all such results concern a difference-making relationship between
(changes in) a modelling assumption, and (changes in) an outcome of interest.
Establishing difference making goes beyond the task of establishing validity. Show-
ing that a modelling assumption makes a difference to an outcome relies on the various
ways of introducing variation into the assumptions. Analogously with Mill’s method
of difference (Mill 1974, Book III, §2), to show that something makes a difference to
something, one must find a pair of scenarios that are similar in all aspects except one,
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such that the difference in the input variable leads to a change in the output. EL mod-
elling includes exactly this kind of reasoning. A model is run with different values of
the independent variables of interest, and the effect of this variation on the dependent
variable of interest is observed. A minimal condition for establishing such a difference-
making claim is that holding other modelling assumptions constant, changes in the
value of the independent variable should lead to changes in the dependent variable.8
A simple example of this is mentioned above: holding other things constant, Weisberg
and Muldoon ran their model with different proportions of mavericks, and observed
the resulting changes in epistemic progress (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009).
Nevertheless, such minimal difference-making tends to be of little argumentative
value because it can only support the claim of dependence under a very specific set
of modelling assumptions. For most purposes, the relationship between two variables
should have some generality across the variation in the variables, and across different
values of other parameters of the model. As critics have pointed out, it was difficult to
determine the relevance of the results achieved by Weisberg and Muldoon because the
analysis of the original EL model did not include any sensitivity or robustness analysis.
In other words, even if the proportion of mavericks makes a difference to epistemic
progress under the set of parameter values employed by Weisberg and Muldoon, it
may be that such an effect only occurs in this particular part of the parameter space
of the model, and hence the difference-making relation might be highly local, even
pointlike. Such locality (non-generality) makes it questionable whether a model can be
used to support more general conclusions.9 Establishing the generality and derivational
robustness of a difference-making result requires showing that some parts of the model
are not difference makers as far as the result is concerned. For example, and intuitively,
results from EL models should not be sensitive to the size of the landscape, the exact
position, shape and number of the hills of epistemic significance, or the order in which
agents move during each time step.
Establishing the irrelevance of such factors works differently in analytical and sim-
ulation models. In the case of analytical modelling, similar results are often derived
under less stringent assumptions during the evolution of a modelling framework, lead-
ing to more general results. In agent-based modelling, however, it is typically not
possible to eliminate modelling assumptions so as to make the results more general.
All the details of the model must be implemented in some form in order to make the
computational model run, thus the generality of results must be established by some
other means. In the following section we suggest that sensitivity analysis, robustness
analysis and the construction of model families could be considered argumentative
modelling moves to that end. More generally, understanding the argumentative role
of agent-based models in philosophy requires not only an understanding of model
8 Note that in ABMs or in complexity modelling, changes in modelling assumptions are often not indepen-
dent/additive. Changing the value of one parameter often influences how other parameters change outcomes,
which means that their relation is nonlinear. This implies that for most purposes, one ought not simply change
these variables one at a time. Instead, the "web of dependencies" must be charted by introducing variation
that changes several things at once.
9 Rosenstock et al. (2017) raise a similar concern about Zollman’s (2007) results showing that the structure
of the epistemic network is connected to the premature convergence of opinions only when the payoffs of
the two hypotheses are extremely close to one another (pA  0.5, pB  0.501 in the original model).
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structure but also practices of model construction and use. The epistemic benefit to
be derived from modelling is commonly realised as a consequence of several mod-
elling attempts—rather than from the development of a single model (more on this in
Sect. 5).
4 Modellingmoves as argumentativemoves
We now introduce the notion of argumentative move and discuss how changes to a
model made by later authors can be analysed as such. This will shed light on the process
of collective exploration, which ultimately determines the argumentative value of a
model. We will also show how changes in a model may give rise to second-generation
models that are intended to support philosophical conclusions quite different from the
original ones.
We define argumentative goals as the general and interim philosophical conclusions
that a philosopher wishes to establish. Such goals are not always explicitly stated, and
they may be presented partially or in a vague manner. It could be that the aims of
the argumentation are so clear from the context that there is no need to articulate
them explicitly. In any case, for the purposes of analysis it is useful to try to articulate
such argumentative goals. We do not presume that a philosopher first chooses the
argumentative goal and then proceeds to the details of the argument. He or she may,
for example, explore a model and discover a goal that can be furthered by using,
modifying and applying it. In this paper, we use the notion of an argumentative goal to
reconstruct the product, not to hypothesise about the process by which it was reached.
Argumentative moves are what philosophers do to reach argumentative goals, given
the context of existing arguments. Such moves include criticism of and amendments to
existing arguments, as well as the introduction of new ones.10 They may, for example,
seek to:
(a) demonstrate the possibility or impossibility of something;
(b) introduce a new idea or consideration into the debate;
(c) examine and hence establish or challenge the validity, generality or scope of an
earlier argument;
(d) support or undermine earlier claims about difference-making;
(e) modify an earlier argument to correct mistakes or to make it more plausible;
(f) provide additional arguments supporting either the premises or the conclusions
of an earlier argument;
(g) broaden the debate by introducing a new perspective on the problem in question.
We do not claim that this list is exhaustive or that the moves are exclusive alternatives.
The list could be extended quite easily. Given that our interest lies in how models
are used in philosophical argumentation, we focus on the argumentative moves that
involve models. We refer to these as modelling moves.
10 Making some of the argumentative moves can be conceived of as interim argumentative goals. Never-
theless, we wish to keep these separate to emphasise what the philosophers do to establish and support their
arguments.
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Modelling moves include (but are not limited to):
(1) modifying the assumptions of the conceptual model;
(2) implementing the assumptions of a conceptual model in a computational model;
(3) articulating the informal assumptions leading to the more general philosophical
conclusion;
(4) introducing a novel set of assumptions and a new model.
We have discussed several modelling moves that concern the Weisberg–Muldoon
model and have observed, for example, how philosophers question the various steps in
Weisberg and Muldoon’s argumentation by modifying the original model and demon-
strating its problems. A significant set of argumentative moves in the literature that
followed the publication of the EL model contains moves that challenged the valid-
ity, generality and scope of their argument. The related modelling moves included
modifying the assumptions and the parameter values in the computational model to
examine its robustness and sensitivity. Robustness and sensitivity analyses could be
seen as tools that help one to find one’s way around an existing web of arguments. Find-
ing highly robust results, in other words conclusions that can be sustained on a wide
variety of premises, is of course valuable. However, such results are rare. What the
modeller often discovers is that a certain result is not robust to a change in premises: in
other words, a new conclusion follows from a modified set of premises. Nonetheless,
discovering a lack of robustness is valuable because it helps modellers learn about the
argumentative landscape, and discover what conclusions follow from specific sets of
premises.
Although Weisberg and Muldoon’s original paper did not report on the robustness of
their results, the work of Thoma (2015), Alexander et al. (2015) and Pöyhönen (2017)
all contribute to such an evaluation. For example, running versions of the model on
both three-dimensional rugged landscapes and NK landscapes provides robustness
checks on Weisberg and Muldoon’s original claims about the usefulness of diversity.
Alexander and co-authors, using the new NK model, show that cognitive diversity
is not necessarily beneficial to an epistemic community, and that it could also do
harm. Pöyhönen’s results similarly qualify Weisberg and Muldoon’s original claim:
in an attempt to make it more precise, the author suggests that cognitive diversity only
provides epistemic benefits on rugged landscapes, not on smooth ones.11
The introduction of a modified or a new model does not only concern robustness
analysis, however, and commonly serves to increase the plausibility of the assumptions
involved in the argument chain. In addition to raising concerns about the generality
of the modelling results, such modelling moves could also be seen as instances of
11 In simulation modelling, examining the validity of models also requires dealing with the problem of
inferential opacity (Humphreys 2004). Given that it is not possible to inspect all the algorithmic steps in a
model run, the modeller must resort to other techniques in building a convincing case that modelling results
do, in fact, follow from the stated assumptions. Using well-known submodels, unit testing, and running
simpler versions of the model are ways of dealing with the credibility challenge in a piecemeal fashion,
arguing for the reliability of the model by establishing the reliability of individual components. Rigorous
and transparent data analysis on multiple levels is another way of addressing the transparency challenge.
As mentioned in Sect. 3, it was through careful data analysis that Alexander and co-authors challenged
Weisberg and Muldoon’s claim about the mechanism by which diversity increases epistemic performance.
As they showed, the existence of mavericks does not stimulate follower performance, contrary to Weisberg
and Muldoon’s assertion.
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challenging the applicability of the model or showing the limited scope of the argument.
Such challenges typically concern the relevance of the modelling assumptions or the
interpretation of the results. Thoma, for example, challenges WM’s original model by
arguing against premise P5 (see Sect. 3.1) according to which scientist agents can only
move within their Moore neighbourhood (2015, p. 462), claiming that this implies an
“extreme level of short sightedness and inflexibility among scientists” (2015, p. 462).
She shows that alternative search rules for agents, which appear to be just as compatible
with the behaviour of scientists as those suggested by Weisberg and Muldoon, lead
to clearly different collective outcomes. Having made these moves, she feels able to
suggest that a division of labour is only beneficial when scientists are not too inflexible
in their choice of a new research topic and not too ignorant of other people’s work. In
sum, Thoma not only shows the limitations of an existing argument, but also develops
a model that supports a more intuitive argument:
The model I have presented not only supports an intuitive result that Weisberg and
Muldoon’s could not; it is also more credible than Weisberg and Muldoon’s in
two major ways: First, it is not restricted to local movement, which I have argued
is implausible as a representation of scientific practice. Second, the explorer and
extractor strategies are better descriptions of the behavior of scientists than the
maverick and follower strategies, since both explorers and extractors avoid the
mere duplication of work others have done. What further speaks in favor of the
model is that a number of its implications map ccredibly [sic] onto features of
actual scientific practice, as evidenced in the course of the article. For instance, on
my model it turns out to be explorer-type behavior that needs special incentives,
which seems plausible. (Thoma 2015, p. 471, emphasis added)
Alexander et al., on the other hand, show the limits of Weisberg and Muldoon’s model
and hence the limited applicability of their conclusion by employing a more plausible
assumption:
The crucial difference between the NK model just described and Weisberg and
Muldoon’s epistemic landscape is this. Expressed as an NK model, Weisberg
and Muldoon’s model assumes fitness functions are highly correlated. […] Why
does this matter? It matters because the Weisberg and Muldoon model builds
into the basic topology of the epistemic landscape correlations that make social
learning advantageous. As such, we should not be surprised to find, in the case
they consider, that cognitive diversity and social interactions between agents can
be beneficial. But, as the generalization to NK landscapes shows, social learning
is not always beneficial. Whether social learning is beneficial or harmful depends
on the topology of the epistemic landscape, a point of which we know very little.
(Alexander et al. 2015, p. 448, emphasis added)
Hence, argumentative moves are not limited to modelling moves that purport to show
the flaws in an existent argument. One might also amend the model to make the
argument more precise, or add new features in arguing for a different point. Alexander
et al.’s model is a good example of a positive contribution that, at first sight, appears
merely as a critical examination. The authors go on in their paper to derive estimates
of the upper and lower bounds of sensible search time on the landscape. In addition
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to providing a starting point for their critical examination of the original EL model,
the methods they employ also give useful insights into the general properties of EL
model worlds.
Similarly, the broadcasting model developed by Pöyhönen (2017) extends the EL
framework in novel ways. The landscapes studied are dynamic, in that the epistemic
work done by the agents alters the distribution of epistemic significance “mass”
between the different research approaches. Consequently, it is implied that cogni-
tive diversity may lead to collective epistemic benefits by bringing about beneficial
coordination between members of the epistemic community (i.e. by modulating the
exploration–exploitation trade-off in collective search).
The literature published after Weisberg and Muldoon introduced their model shows
that, despite the shortcomings of the original model, the idea of interpreting a research
topic as a landscape and modelling scientists as agents with different strategies has
given rise to a new and fruitful framework, and has raised a number of research
questions that had not thus far been carefully analysed. A further indication of the
fruitfulness of the approach is that a “second generation” of models has emerged
since the publication of the first set of models building on the original EL framework
(Alexander et al. 2015; Thoma 2015; Pöyhönen 2017). In many of these second-
generation models, the EL framework is applied beyond its original domain to study
issues such as funding allocation in science and to derive science-policy-relevant
conclusions. The models also provide more examples of argumentative moves.12
Whereas the first-generation models focused on refining and criticising the original
Weisberg–Muldoon model, the second-generation models are modified versions of the
original model to serve different argumentative goals. For this reason, it is important
to pay close attention to their details and argumentative goals. For example, Shahar
Avin’s (2019) main aim is to examine the role of funding-allocation mechanisms.
Deviating from the original goals of the Weisberg–Muldoon model, Avin primarily
attempts to direct the attention of social epistemologists from individual motives and
learning strategies to institutional arrangements. At the same time, he addresses a novel
audience, science-policy researchers, to convince them that the employment of lottery
mechanisms in funding allocation could lead to a better epistemic output. Despite
the introduction of new argumentative goals, Alvin’s argument is based on relatively
modest modifications to the Weisberg–Muldoon model. This is crucial: if one were to
focus merely on the features of Alvin’s model without paying close attention to the
argumentative goals and context, one would easily miss the point of the exercise.
The second-generation models developed by Balietti et al. (2015) and Currie and
Avin (2019) provide another kind of example, where the models as well as the argu-
mentative goals and the conceptual premises are quite different. Just as Weisberg and
Muldoon borrowed their argumentative device (the idea of an adaptive landscape and
the techniques to model it) from biology and adapted it to serve their own purposes
(Gerrits and Marks 2015), these authors transform the EL framework to suit their
purposes. As in the case of Balietti et al., the audiences can be remarkably differ-
ent too. Their article was published in PLOS ONE, not a typical forum for social
12 The boundary between first- and-second generation models is not always clear-cut. Harnagel (2019) is a
good example, and could be interpreted as either, depending on which aspects of the paper are emphasised.
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epistemology. These changes make the arguments of the second-generation models
largely independent of Weisberg and Muldoon’s argument. Whatever is the ultimate
scholarly evaluation of Weisberg and Muldoon’s argument, it does not directly affect,
strengthen or weaken the argumentative force of the second-generation models. In
other words, their epistemic fates are different. As a consequence, the analysis of the
implications of the second-generation models could be carried out separately from
the original discussion. Nevertheless, second-generation models might still be useful
for philosophers. For example, modellers in philosophy could learn a lot from Balietti
et al.’s methodology and carefully executed analysis, even though they might have
difficulties in accepting their implementation of the idea of “ground truth.”
The second-generation models appear to expand the space of exploration. However,
given the combination of modified EL models and different argumentative goals, they
also introduce new ambiguity to the interpretation of EL models. From the perspective
of the modellers, one way to overcome this ambiguity is to make the argumentative
steps associated with agent-based models more explicit than is currently the practice.
Using models as black-boxes in philosophical argumentation and leaving many steps
of the argumentation implicit often result in barriers to understanding. If the changes to
the modelling assumptions, the argumentative goals and the way in which the model is
used remain implicit, the nature of the modelling endeavor might remain obscure and
lead to misunderstandings. Moreover, the lack of explicitness could invite skepticism
as the critical audience often takes the lack of argumentative detail as an indicator of
arrogance and obscurity. Finally, as new models and arguments are introduced, the
contribution of the first-generation models may be blurred as the (possibly unrecog-
nised) second-generation models muddle the debate. As it is in the case of science,
models in philosophy should not be used as black boxes in argumentation. It is crucial
that the audience understands what goes inside the model (the relation between the
conceptual and the computational), how the model is used to reach the conclusions,
and how this fits to the broader argumentative context.
5 Themodel family as a unit of epistemic evaluation
Thus far, the discussion has focused on particular argumentative goals and modelling
moves that are to be found in articles published in the wake of Weisberg and Mul-
doon’s original paper. This helped us to highlight the role of models as argumentative
devices. However, the narrow focus on individual modelling moves still keeps us from
fully grasping the value and limits of models in social epistemology. With this focus,
each argumentative move appears as a countermove to a previous one, whereas the
ultimate raison d’être behind the use of the EL framework in social epistemology is an
interest in cognitive diversity. To avoid being blindsided by individual argumentative
modelling moves, one could zoom out from individual models and articles to see how
the argumentative moves and the individual models relate to one another, and consider
whether they—as a whole—serve any useful purpose in terms of understanding the
role of cognitive diversity in science.
Table 1 summarises the assumptions and results of the first-generation EL models.
One way of reading the table is to look at the individual models and their results.
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Table 1 Assumptions and results of EL models
(New) Assumptions Results
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) Control, follower and maverick
search rules
Smooth landscapes
Measures of epistemic efficiency:
(1) finding peaks, (2) epistemic
progress and (3) total progress
Division of labour: epistemic
performance of a population
increased when maverick
agents are added to it
Pure population of maverick
agents outperforms all other
populations
Thoma (2015) Local search is not constrained to
the Moore neighbourhood
Extractor and extractor search
rules
Division of labour is only
beneficial when scientists are
not too inflexible in their choice
of a new research topic and not
too ignorant of others’ work
Alexander et al. (2015) Swarm rule
Study of NK landscapes
Diversity can adversely affect
epistemic efficiency
Swarm agents are more efficient
than mavericks
Social learning only works on
particular NK landscapes
Pöyhönen (2017) Broadcasting rule for social
learning
Measuring performance as
epistemic work
Rugged landscapes
No social learning is needed on
smooth landscapes
Mixed populations fare better
than 100% maverick
populations on rugged
landscapes
Diversity modulates a collective
exploration–exploitation
balance
Unrealistic and non-robust models follow one another, and it is not clear what their
contribution is. Alternatively, one could see the table as a summary of argumentative
modelling moves that philosophers employ to make a point in a debate. Although this
reading is more useful than the first one—because it pays attention to the argumentative
context—it still does not help the reader to fully appreciate the value of the individual
models. A third option is to zoom out from the individual models and focus on the table
as a whole. Consequently, one can see that there is more to the individual contributions
than serving as counterarguments to an existing model. We adopt the third reading
and view these models as a family that helps philosophers to explore an argumentative
landscape. The modelling efforts of individual philosophers could be seen as attempts
to explore and chart a network of dependency relations between modelling assumptions
and conclusions of interest.
We argue above that each of these models helps in establishing difference makers
within the framework defined by their assumptions. Focusing on individual models,
however, prevents us from seeing the epistemic benefit of modelling that is realised as
a consequence of several modelling attempts. This is because the individual models do
not support a single strong conclusion about cognitive diversity and epistemic perfor-
mance. In fact, each model shows what happens given its particular set of assumptions.
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In the absence of knowledge about what happens when these assumptions change, it is
difficult to see if the results of the model have wider applicability. However, conceived
of as a family, individual models introduce variation to Weisberg and Muldoon’s EL
framework. In other words, as a family, EL models help to make visible a set of depen-
dencies that can be established under a variety of related assumptions. The collection
of individual argumentative modelling moves within the model family helps in map-
ping a web of dependencies between changes in subsets of modelling assumptions
and their implications.
Let us consider how this differs from the derivational robustness of a modelling
result. Non-robust results are commonly considered a weakness of a model. How-
ever, from the family perspective they could be helpful in terms of articulating the
scope of dependencies indicated by individual models, and thereby direct attention to
unexplored dependencies in the modelling framework. Thus, what might seem to be a
troubling non-robust result in an individual model could provide valuable information
when considered in the context of a family of models. Introducing variation into the
modelling environment could help modellers to map their way in an argumentative
landscape, and to discover which conclusions follow from which sets of premises. In
other words, from the family-of-models perspective what matters is the discovery of
the variety of dependencies between premises and conclusions. The question at the
family-of-models level is not whether the individual model results are derivationally
robust, but what general claims one can support on the basis of the available family
of models.13
Modelling in this sense could be conceived of as learning about model worlds and
exploring an argumentative landscape. It is no surprise that modellers themselves often
emphasise the explorative nature of a modelling endeavour. Weisberg and Muldoon, for
example, are aware of the limitations of their model and suggest that the EL framework
needs further exploration. They admit that their model “only scratch[es] the surface
of what might be explored using epistemic landscape models” (2009, p. 249), and
suggest ways in which to explore this framework:
Landscapes can be made more rugged, they can contain more information, explo-
ration strategies can take into account more information, an economy of money
and credit can be included, and so forth. Much work remains to be done in real-
izing these possibilities, all of which we believe can be built within our existing
framework. (2009, p. 249)
The family-of-models perspective also fosters the realisation that variation in mod-
els is not limited to small changes in the respective assumptions. The models differ
on several dimensions: central concepts (diversity, division of cognitive labour, social
learning) are operationalised differently, different mechanisms function between diver-
sity and epistemic success, and the models keep track of various outcome measures. It
is difficult to make sense of this solely from the perspective of derivational robustness,
because the set of EL models do not result from systematic derivational robustness
analysis, which would require altering one assumption at a time. However, if the vari-
13 We thank one of the referees of the paper for pointing out that at the family-of-models level, a broader
notion of robustness (rather than the more stringent derivational robustness) could be employed.
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ation between these models is seen as the consequence of argumentative moves that
serve argumentative goals, it is easier to understand why they differ on several dimen-
sions. The individual modelling attempts are not only concerned with the robustness of
one existing model. As we have pointed out, contributions to the literature also purport
to explore what can be argued on the basis of a distinct set of more plausible assump-
tions, or what happens if new considerations, such as funding, are introduced into the
modelling framework. For example, not only do Alexander et al. (2015) explore the
Weisberg–Muldoon model to enhance understanding of the dependencies involved
and to check whether the model is interpreted appropriately to fit the subject of the
study, they also introduce what they think of as a more plausible model to analyse the
dependencies.
If one focuses on EL models as a cluster, without losing sight of the argumentative
goals served by each one, it is easier to see how the particular argumentative moves
help to identify possible dependencies among the selected set of factors. Not only does
exploration of the EL framework enhance understanding of how individual models
work, it also helps in reasoning about more general dependencies. In fact, building
multiple idealised models could be helpful in terms of focusing on a limited set of
factors at any one time, and as a strategy it helps to overcome the complexity of the
subject matter (Weisberg 2013). In this sense, building a family of models could be
conceived of as a collective (although not usually intentional) argumentative move,
which helps to establish and refine a philosophical conclusion of interest
Despite its flaws, the Weisberg–Muldoon model provided a new approach to a
problem and helped an expanding community of modellers to explore different ways
in which cognitive diversity could influence epistemic outcomes. What this amounts
to in family-of-models terms is a network of what-if s that matches different aspects of
the population with different kinds of epistemic success. Even though the EL family
does not support a “master” conclusion, it has in an incremental fashion enhanced
understanding about the various dependencies between the elements of the modelled
scenario.
Note that the family-of-models perspective may lead to an epistemic evaluation of
the model’s contribution that differs from the one drawn up by the people proposing it.
It might turn out that the argumentative moves the modeler first had in mind are more
limited in terms of usability than they envisioned, or even unviable, and a collective
process of exploration might identify better and more credible applications of the same
basic ideas.
As we point out above, the two most common criteria indicating the epistemic
value in models, representational adequacy and derivational robustness, ignore the
argumentative context and hence do not suffice to shed light on how an abstract model
contributes to a philosophical debate, or on how it helps to answer a philosophical
question. The family-of-models perspective further supports this argument in implying
that one cannot assess the argumentative contribution of a model by focusing merely
on its first presentation. The argumentative force of the Weisberg–Muldoon model
becomes clear only as the result of the collective work of the people who refined,
criticised and explored the EL framework. The understanding gleaned from working
with these model variants cannot be summarised in one model. Knowledge of model
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variants accumulates gradually, enhancing understanding of the web of dependencies
among the assumptions, selected factors and the conclusions.
6 Conclusions
We have argued that models in philosophy should be seen as argumentative devices. As
the case of EL models demonstrates, they do not necessarily have concretely identified
targets and they are not intended to be used as accurate representations. Furthermore,
pairwise model-target comparisons alone cannot reveal much about the value of a (set
of) models because they omit the relevant argumentative goals (“what the model is used
for”), the argumentative context and important details concerning the use of models
in a philosophical argument. Analyses of models should include the argumentative
context because their full epistemic value can only be perceived when their use is seen
as part of argumentative exchange.
We have also argued that the different EL models constitute a cluster or family of
models, each change in a model reflecting an argumentative move made by the mod-
eller. Each move serves an argumentative goal: supporting or debunking an existing
argument/conclusion, evaluating its scope, or extending an argument pattern into a
new domain, for example. Furthermore, this model family should be considered as a
whole if the full epistemic contribution of the models is to be understood: the under-
standing created by a family of models cannot be summarised in any one of them. What
the study of model variants contributes is a piece-by-piece accumulation of knowl-
edge about dependencies between assumptions and results. As the family-of-models
perspective shows, the general contribution of a model can be better assessed after
systematic variations of it have been studied. This is highlighted in the argumentative
perspective: the simulation result is not the same as the argumentative conclusion that
the simulation model was intended to support.
The perspective outlined in this paper could be fruitful as a method for ratio-
nally reconstructing the argumentative contribution of agent-based simulations and
other abstract models in philosophy and in science. Rather than getting stuck with the
apparent representational inadequacies of these models, or hard-to-interpret authorial
intentions, in this approach the attention is directed to issues that really matter in terms
of evaluating the model’s contribution. As our reconstruction of the debate about EL
models indicates, it is not uncommon for the model’s true value to be revealed only
after a series of replications, modifications and extensions. Although the significance
of the original idea cannot be denied, the full epistemic contribution is a collective
product.
It is notable that the approach developed in this paper is also applicable beyond
social epistemology and philosophy. Assessment of the epistemic contribution of
highly simplified theoretical models is also difficult in the sciences.14 Modellers in
the sciences may have different argumentative goals from those of their philosophi-
cal cousins, but general ideas about the importance of the argumentative context, the
14 Frigg and Nguyen (2017) provide an overview of the difficulties faced by representational accounts of
models.
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implicit steps between the model and the intended theoretical conclusions, the signif-
icance of argumentative and modelling moves, and the contribution of the collective
exploration of model variants apply in both contexts. The utility of a general approach
such as this is especially salient when the modelling frameworks travel—as in the case
of EL models (Gerrits and Marks 2015)—from one discipline to another.
One advantage of the proposed approach is that it makes it possible to compare
simulation models to other argumentative resources employed in philosophy. Thought
experiments are an interesting comparison, because they are widely used in epistemol-
ogy, and models could be considered formalised thought experiments (Currie and Avin
2019). In contrast to thought experiments, model development enables the model’s
premises to be related to the conclusions in a systematic and rigorous way: unlike in
thought experiments, the relation between assumptions and conclusions depends not
on reader’s intuition, but on explicitly stated (and ideally freely available) premises
and implementation detail, and can be exposed to public scrutiny.
Simulation models deserve a fair hearing, and we claim that only by adopting an
argumentative approach such as the one outlined in this paper is it possible thoroughly
to assess their contribution to social epistemology and philosophy in general. In our
judgment, it is too early to say how valuable an argumentative resource this particular
class of argumentative devices might be. In any case, the contribution of these models
should be assessed accurately. Hyping about their potential could easily lead to the
overestimation of their argumentative reach, which could produce a backlash that
could undermine their serious use in later debates. For example, to argue that social
epistemological toy models suffice to justify science-policy recommendations is quite
premature (pace Kummerfeld and Zollman 2015). On the other hand, those who are
highly critical of models run the risk of missing out on many valuable contributions.
Given that social epistemology, like all areas of philosophy, is seeking to employ strong
and credible argumentative resources that produce both convincing and interesting
conclusions, we should not be purists with respect to available argumentative devices.
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